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CARL R. SESSIONS, 
Third-Party Denfendant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11350 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff and 
respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 
to recover from the def end ant, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, the amount of $676.18 under an alleged 
right of subrogation arising from the payment of 
medical expenses to the plaintiff's insured under 
the provisions of the plaintiff's policy of insurance. 
Defendant contends that there is no such right of 
subrogation in the State of Utah, and secondly that 
even if there is the plaintiff herein did not give suf-
ficient notice to the defendant of its subrogation 
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interest and therefore is precluded from making re-
covery from the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After defendant's motion to dismiss had been 
denied the plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment which was granted awarding to the plain-
tiff the amount of $676.18, interest, and costs of 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the 
lower court's summary judgment in plaintiff's favor 
and dismiss plaintiff's actions on the grounds that 
as a matter of law there exists no such right of sub-
rogation. If, however, this Court holds that there 
is such a right of subrogation defendant requests 
the Court to remand the case to the lower court to 
determine the factual question of whether defendant 
had sufficient notice of plaintiff's right of subroga-
tion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts here are essentially without dispute. 
On June 27, 1967, at the Geneva Steel parking lot 
in Utah County, one Doyle Sweat backed his 1956 
Chevrolet truck into a 1967 Buick Riviera owned 
and occupied at said time by Carl R. Sessions re-
sulting in property damage and personal injuries to 
Carl R. Session. 
2 
At the time of said accident, Carl R. Sessions 
was an insured under an automobile liability policy 
issued by the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Insur-
ance Company, which policy of insurance contained 
a coverage known as Medical Pay Coverage, under 
which State Farm was required to pay up to $1,000 
for medical expenses incurred by Carl R. Sessions, 
which in said accident amounted to $676.18. Said 
policy of insurance provided that the insurer, State 
Farm, would be subrogated against the third party 
tort feasor for the amounts paid under said medical 
pay coverage, and said policy in addition provided 
that the insured should execute and deliver instru-
ments and do whatever necessary to secure such 
subrogation rights for the insurer and that the in-
sured should do nothing after the loss to prejudice 
such subrogation rights. On the other hand Doyle 
Sweat was on said date insured under an automobile 
liability policy issued by defendant, Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange, covering him for any liability aris-
ing from said accident. 
On August 4, 1967, respondent through its 
Senior Field Claims Representative, Martin Young, 
wrote a letter to the appellant which stated as fol-
lows: 
"We have been informed that you are the 
insurance carrier for the party designated as 
your insured in the caption of this letter. 
"Our investigation establishes that your 
insured was responsible for this accident. The 
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purpose of this letter is to inform you that 
we have collision and medical payments cov. 
erage on the above policy, both being written 
on a subrogation basis. 
"While we have not been called upon to 
make payment under these coverages we wish 
to go on record of our possible interest and 
ask that you proceed accordingly. 
"We wish to thank you for your coopera-
tion and if we can assist you in any way 
please advise. 
Yours very truly, 
Martin Young" 
On the same day Martin Young mailed drafts for 
Sessions's medical expenses of $676.18. (Exhibit 
P-1) 
Five days later on August 9, 1967, defendant 
Farmers in behalf of its insured Doyle Sweat enter-
ed into a settlement with said Carl R. Sessions for 
any and all claims he may have against Sweat and 
Farmers arising from said accident, paying him 
$4,127.87 and receiving from Sessions a full and 
general release. 
Subsequent to said settlement State Farm made 
demand upon defendant Farmers for reimburse-
ment of said amount, which Farmers denied in a 
letter dated October 19, 1967. State Farm then filed 
the present action seeking to recover $676.18 under 
its alleges subrogation rights. Defendant Farmers 
filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground 
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that a cause of action had not been stated, in partic-
ular that as a matter of law no right of subrogation 
of medical expenses exists in the State of Utah, and 
that in addition respondent's insured Sessions was 
a necessary party to said action inasmuch as he to-
tally released appellant from any further liability 
to defendant or its insured. The lower court denied 
the motion, and appellant filed its answer. Appel-
lant then on leave of court filed a third party com-
plaint against Carl R. Sessions alleging that if any-
one was liable to State Farm it was Sessions since 
he recovered his medical expenses twice and execut-
ed a full and complete release to appellant. Service 
was not accomplished on Sessions inasmuch as he 
had moved to Montana. Respondent then filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment without affidavit or 
other evidence offered. At the hearing of said mo-
tion appellant denied plaintiff's right of subrogation 
and questioned the adequacy of respondent's notice 
of August 4, 1967 (Exhibit D-2) and raised the 
issue of whether payment of said medical expenses 
had been made prior to appellant's settlement with 
Sessions in response to which State Farm offered 
in evidence Exhibit P-1 showing payments of the 
medical expenses on August 4, 1967. After hearing 
counsels' argument and reviewing the Memoran-
dums of Law filed previously in defendant's motion 
to dismiss, the court granted plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment holding that as a matter of law 
respondent had a right to subrogate against the de-
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fendant on the medical expense payments and that 
the notice of August 4 constituted adequate notice. 
Appellant takes issue with both holdings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT IN FINDING THAT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW A RIGHT OF SUBROGA-
TION EXISTS IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATE FARM FOR MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
ERRED INASMUCH AS SAID SUBROGATION 
VIOLA'TES PUB LI C P 0 LI C Y AND IS 
AGAINST THE LAW AS AN ASSIGNMENT 
OF AN ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES 
AND AS A SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
Medical expenses are an obvious element of a 
personal injury action. This principal is acknowledg-
ed in the cases cited below and is generally stated 
in 22 Am Jur 2d §102 page 149: "One of the princi-
pal elements of damages in a personal injury action 
is the value of medical expenses." 
The first and most obvious objection to the de-
fendant's alleged right of subrogation is that in the 
State of Utah and in most other states it is clearly 
the law that a cause of action for personal injuries 
is not assignable. In 40 ALR 2nd 502 numerous cases 
are cited espousing the common law rule which for-
bids the assignments of causes of action for personal 
injury. The Utah cases generally in agreement with 
the common law rule are Fritz vs. Wes tern Union 
Telegraph Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 Pac. 209 (Dic-
6 
turn, 1903); Mayer vs. Rankin, 91Utah193, 63 Pac. 
2nd 611 (1936). The most recent pronouncement 
on this point is in the case of In Re Behm's Estate, 
117 Utah 151, 213 Pac. 2nd 657, wherein the court 
held on page 662 in the Pacific Report that the cause 
of action for personal injury was not assignable. 
The court further held that the owner of the cause 
of action could assign the proceeds from the cause 
of action but that he would have to prosecute the 
action himself and could not tr an sf er the owner-
ship of the cause of action. 
The rule of non-assignability of an action for 
personal injuries has extensive historical roots, 
which are still pertinent to the present scene. Num-
erous courts in recent years have faced the identi-
cal problem contained in this case and have reaf-
firmed the non-assignability of all or a portion of a 
personal injury claim. A case directly in point with 
the present action is that of Harleysville Mutual 
Insurance Company vs. Lea, 410 Pac. 2nd 495, Ari-
zona (1966). In that case Harleysville Mutual issu-
ed an automobile insurance policy to Lea which con-
tained medical expense coverage. Lea was involved 
in an accident resulting in bodily injury to himself. 
Harleysville paid to Lea the amount of $620.98 for 
medical expenses and Lea in turn signed a receipt 
and release in behalf of Harleysville subrogating it 
to Lea's claim against the tort feasor for medical 
expenses. Lea then subsequently entered into a set-
tlement with the tort feasor and refused to reim-
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burse Harleysville to the extent of the benefits paid 
by Harleysville under its medical provisions. Har. 
leysville then brought a suit against Lea for the 
amount of the medical payments. At trial Lea moved 
to dismiss, which motion was granted. On appeal the 
Arizona Court of Appeals pointed out that whether 
or not the subrogation rights arose from the policy 
or from the receipt and release, the question was 
nevertheless whether or not Lea had the ability in 
law to assign in whole or in part his cause of action 
for personal injuries to Harleysville. Harleysville 
argued that the historical rule of non-assignability 
of personal injury actions had been abrogated in 
Arizona inasmuch as the Arizona legislature had 
1 
recently passed a statute which provided for causes , 
of action to survive except that on the death of the , 
person injured the damages for pain and suffering 
of such person did not survive. That decision is di- 1 
rectly in point with the present case inasmuch as 1 
respondent here claims that the recently enacted 
Utah statute, 78-11-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
1967 Pocket Supplement, has changed the rule in 
Utah in regards to the survivability of actions for 
medical and funeral expenses. That section is iden-
tical with the newly enacted Arizona statute which 
the Arizona court held to be irrelevant to the ques-
tion of assignability of such causes of action. The 
court there held that it mattered not whether an 
action for personal injuries survived in whole or in 
part, the point being that it was against public 
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policy of the State of Arizona to allow the assign-
ment of causes of action for personal injuries. The 
court indicated that unscrupulous people would pur-
chase causes of action for personal injury and there-
by traffic in personal injury lawsuits, which obvi-
ously is a very real possibility should said causes of 
action be assignable. The Arizona court then went 
on to point out that other states had also come to 
the same conclusion under similar facts using the 
basis of public policy as well as other reasons. The 
court referred to the California case of Peller vs. 
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 34 Cal. 
Rep. 41 ( 1963). There an action for declaratory 
relief was brought by the insured against his own 
insurer alleging that the insurer would not make 
payment under the medical payments provisions of 
his policy unless he entered into a subrogation agree-
ment and assigned the right or recovery in the per-
sonal injury action to the extent of the medical ex-
pense payment to the insurer. The trial court grant-
ed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the 
plaintiff insured. On appeal the appellate court up-
held the rule of non-assignability of a cause of ac-
tion arising out of personal injuries. The insurer in 
that case attempted to label the subrogation as an 
indemnity; however, the court rejected this stating 
that the distinction was purely verbal in that the 
legal effect of the policy provisions is the same re-
gardless of what term is attached to the procedure 
since the result is to transfer the insured's cause 
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of action against third-party tort feasor to the in-
surer. The court held that such right of subrogation 
could only come by the direct act of the California 
legislature and not by a court-made law. The comt , 
also referred to the cases of Nielson Realty Corpor-
ation vs. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnificatfon 
Corporation, 262 N.Y.S. 2nd 652 ( 1965) ; Bethle-
hem Fabricators vs. H. D. Watts Company, 190 N.E. 
828( 1934); and Hereford vs. Meek, 62 S.E. 2nd 
7 40, West Virginia ( 1949). The court then referred 
to another recent case directly on point - Travelers 
lndeninity Company vs. Chumbley, 394 S.W. 2nd 
418 ( 1965). There the insurer had sued its insured 
and the third-party tort feasor to recover the amount 
of medical payments which it had paid to its insur-
ed.. The insurer's policy had the usual subrogation 
provision. The insurer had paid to the insured his 
claim for medical expenses and had given notice of 
said alleged subrogation right to the tort feasor. 
Subsequently the insured settled with the tort feasor. 
Both the defendants made motions to dismiss the 
action, which were on the basis that neither stated a 
cause of action. The lower court granted both mo-
tions. On appeal the court affirmed the dismissal as 
to both the insured and the tort feasor. In doing so 
the court held that Missouri followed the common 
law rule prohibiting the assignment of a cause of 
action for personal injuries and that such purported 
assignment of the right to recover the medical ex-
penses was a violation of said rule. The court indi-
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cated one objection to allowing subrogation on the 
medical payments would be that if it were so allow-
ed all automobile insurers and other health and ac-
cident insurers would insist upon subrogation as to 
medical payments, thus resulting in multiple sub-
rogation claims. The court said in that regard: 
" ... And, so it seems to us, multiple sub-
rogation claims inevitably would lead to con-
flicts and disputes between subrogation claim-
ants, would complicate and make more diffi-
cult the negotiation of voluntary settlements 
with third-party tort feasors, and would en-
courage and promote suits in interpleaders, 
all running counter to the policy of the law." 
The court felt it would be lifting the lid on a Pan-
dora's box to allow subrogation of medical expenses 
to be an exception to the well-established rule of 
non-assignability. It is also interesting to note that 
in the Chumbley case the insurer argued that medi-
cal expenses should be treated as property damage. 
The court rejected this saying that the medical ex-
penses arose directly from the bodily injury and 
were an integral element of the personal injury 
cause of action, and that such medical expenses stood 
on a much different footing than property damage 
and therefore was not assignable. The court said 
in that regard: 
" ... Noting only in passing that the case 
at bar presents a novel and unique situation 
in which plaintiff not only would split the 
cause of action for personal injury by sever-
ing therefrom the claim for medical expenses 
1·1 
but also would fragment that claim by divid-
ing it between the plaintiff and Chumbley 
$500 to the former and the remainder to th~ 
latter." 
In addition to the reasons given by the above cases, 
the Arizona court also put forth the following as a 
further basis for its holding: 
" ... In the instant case we have a con-
tract of insurance entered into prior to the 
accident providing for payments under the 
medical pay provision portion of the contract. 
The insured paid a premium for this policy 
and is entitled to the medical payment re-
gardless of any further action he may take in 
bringing suit against the tort feasor. Should 
he recover after suit and trial, he will have to 
pay a portion of his recovery for attorneys' 
fees and costs, and expense which the appel-
lant herein ignores in demanding the return 
of the full amount paid to the appellee. To re-
quire the insured to subrogate these funds or 
to assign the amount to the insurer, especially 
when there is no way of apportioning the 
amount in the whole of the judgment or settle-
ment, it can only lead to further litigation, 
subterfuge and deceit." 
Thus, it is quite obvious that the Arizona court took 
a long look at the problem, considering recent cases 
on the problem and relevant facets of public policy, 
and was correct in holding that there was no right 
of subrogation in the State of Arizona on the med-
ical expenses. 
One other very recent case which has dealt with 
this specific problem is Forsthove vs. Hardware 
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Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 416 S.W. 
2nd 208, ( 1967 Mo. App.). In this case Forsthove 
was the tort feasor and Farm Bureau was his in-
surer, and Marks was the injured insured and Hard-
ware Dealers his insurer. Marks' wife was injured 
in a collision with the Forsthove vehicle, from which 
she died. Hardware Dealers policy contained medi-
cal pay provisions similar to those in the present 
case, and pursuant to said provision paid to Marks 
$1,500 for medical and funeral expenses. After mak-
ing said payment, Hardware Dealers demanded a 
written assignment and subrogation receipt. Subse-
quently, Marks settled with the tort feasor and its 
insurance company. Hardware Dealers had served 
notice upon the tort feasor and his insurer, Farm 
Bureau, of its subrogation rights. Farm Bureau not 
knowing to whom the money should be paid filed a 
bill of interpleader, and all were joined in the inter-
pleader action. Marks claimed he was entitled to 
the entire settlement amount on the grounds that 
the purported assignment to his insurer was pro-
hibited by law. Hardware Dealers claimed that the 
policy created an equitable assignment of Marks's 
claim for the medical expenses to the extent paid by 
Hardware Dealers. Hardware Dealers also made 
several alternative claims, one based on restitution 
and another for breach of contract. The court re-
jected all of Hardware Dealers contentions and af-
firmed the trial court's holding which had held that 
Marks was entitled to the full amount of the settle-
13 
ment. The court agreed with the Travelers lndem. 
nity Company vs. Chumbley case previously cited 
that the cause of action was not assignable due to 
public policy considerations to prevent barter and 
trade of personal injury actions by injured people 
and creditors. The court stated that whether or not 
the cause of action survived had no significance in 
determining whether the cause of action was assign-
able under that court's view of the problem. The 
court in denying the alternative basis for recovery 
in behalf of Hardware Dealers stated that to allow 
these claims would be to allow them to do indirectly 
what the court had just held they could not do di-
rectly. And as the Arizona court had mentioned in 
the Harleysville Mutual case, the court also noted 
that Marks had paid a premium for this policy and 
under the circumstances was entitled to the funeral 
expense payment regardless of what further action 
he might have taken in bringing suit against the '. 
tort feasors. The following are other rather recent 
cases which have also recognized the non-assignabil-
ity of personal injury actions: Putnam vs. Contin-
ental Air Transport Company, 297 F. 2nd 501 (CA , 
7, Illinois); Washington vs. Washington, 302 Pac. 
2nd 569, California; Clar vs. Dayde County, 116 
South 2nd 34, Florida; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company vs. Reed Construction Company, 132 South 
2nd 626, Florida; Remsen vs. Midway Liquors, Inc., 
174 N.E. 2nd 7, Illinois; Juba vs. General Builders 
Supply Corporation, 194 N.Y.S. 2nd 503, 163 N.E. 
14 
2nd 328; Crawford vs. O'Sullivan, 189 N.Y.S. 2nd 
724; and Richmond vs. Hanes, 122 S.E. 2nd 895, 
Virginia. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the cases 
previously cited constitute the desirable result to be 
achieved in the present case. This Court has never 
strayed from the proposition that the causes of ac-
tion for personal injury were not assignable. There 
is no reason to change that rule today. In fact, as 
was pointed out in the cases above, there are very 
compelling policy reasons for not allowing subroga-
tion on medical expenses, the most important being: 
( 1) the creation and encouragement of litigation 
and multiple claims, (2) the hindrance to the al-
ready difficult road to settlement of personal injury 
claims, (3) the barter and trade of personal injury 
actions, if the same were made assignable, ( 4) in-
jured party has paid premiums for the coverage and 
should be allowed the benefits therefrom. Where a 
party has paid premiums on insurance, the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah has confirmed he should 
be able to recover the amount due regardless of col-
lateral sources. In the recent case of Phillips vs. 
Bennett, 439 Pac. 2nd 457, ________ Utah 2nd --------
( 1968), the Supreme Court affirmed the collateraJ 
source rule saying that the plaintiff was entitled to 
an instruction that insurance proceeds received by 
the plaintiff for medical expenses, the premiums 
of which were not paid by the def end ant, could not 
be used to reduce the judgment for medical specials 
15 
against tort feasor. The same policy should hold in 
the present situation in that if a person has paid 
premiums for medical coverage, the insurer should 
not be able to defeat that payment under said cov-
erage by inserting in the policy a subrogation clause 
in violation of the rule of non-assignability and 
clearly against the public interest of the State of 
Utah. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF STA TE FARM HAD GIVEN ADE-
QUATE NOTICE TO DEFENDANT FARMERS 
OF ITS SUBROGATION INTEREST PRIOR TO 
DEFENDANT'S SETTLEMENT WITH THE 
INSURED SESSIONS. 
The present point, of course, becomes pertin-
ent only if the Court should find that the plaintiff 
has a right to subrogation. In such event, defendant 
contends that the letter of August 4 (Exhibit D-2) 
was as a matter of law insufficient to constitut~ 
notice of State Farm's subrogation rights, and that 
a question of fact was created as to whether Farm-
ers had, by August 9, acquired sufficient notice. 
Defendant respectfully contends that on such 
grounds the summary judgment in plaintiff's favor 
was improper. 
To clarify the record as to the notice issue, it 
should first be noted that the letter in the record 
(R. 54) from appellant's counsel to Judge D. Frank 
Wilkins who was considering defendant's motion 
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for dismissal wherein counsel indicates there was no 
issue as to notice was not intended nor treated by 
the parties as a waiver of that issue. At that time 
the issue before Judge Wilkins on the motion to dis-
miss was whether or not a right of subrogation ex-
isted and thus whether a cause of action would lie. 
In addition, when said letter was sent the contents 
of the August 4 letter were not known to appellant's 
counsel. At the hearing of plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, the contents of the August 4 
letter were known to counsel who there raised the 
notice issue without objection from respondent, and 
said issue was argued to and considered by the 
court. 
It has been unanimously recognized in property 
damage cases in the absence of fraud or collusion 
that no subrogation rights arise when payment is 
made by the subrogee insurer after its insured had 
settled with a tort feasor. Phillips vs. Worthen, 251 
S.W. 2nd 118, Arkansas (1952); Tyre vs. Andrus, 
104 A. 2nd 775, Delaware (1954); New York Un-
derwriters Insurance Company vs. Louisville and 
N.R. Company, 148 S.W. 2nd 710 Kentucky (1941); 
Cleveland vs. Chesapeake and Potomas Telephone 
Company, 169 A. 2nd 446, Maryland ( 1961, recog-
nizing the rule); Motorist Mutual Insurance, Com-
pany vs. Gerson, 177 N.E. 2nd 790, Ohio (1960, re-
cognizing the rule) ; Service Fire Insurance Com-
pany vs. Nicosia, 38 Del. Co. 200 ( 1951) ; Calvert 
Fire Insurance Company vs. James, 114 S.E. 2nd 
17 
832, South Carolina ( 1960); Gulf Insurance C()m. 
pany vs. White, 242 S.W. 2nd 663, Texas (1951); 
and see the notation in 92 ALR 2nd 112. That same 
reasoning clearly applies to situations where the 
payment was made prior to the settlement with the 
tort feasor but where notice of such subrogation 
rights were not given until after said settlement had 
been effected. 
Some courts have gone one step further and 
have held that in order to be effective the notice 
must state that payment has been made, and mere 
allegation that a claim was being made against the 
subrogee was not sufficient notice to raise a sub-
rogation right. In the case of Allstate Insurance 
Company vs. Dye, 170 N.E. 2nd 862, Ohio (1960), 
the subrogee insurance company gave notice that a 
claim had been made under its policy, but such 
notice did not state that payment had been made 
nor a subrogation receipt executed; and the court . 
held that such notice was defective and the tort 
feasor was not liable to the insurance company. In 
Service Fire Insurance Company vs. Nicosia, 38 
Del. Co. 200, Pennsylvania ( 1951), the tort feasor · 
admitted notice had been given but contended that 
the notice was insufficient inasmuch as it did not 
state that payment had been made by the subrogee. 
The court held that such notice was insufficient and 
that subrogation rights did not arise until notice of 
payment. Although there are a few cases on this 
subject, the above cases appear to reflect the rule 
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to be applied in judging the effectiveness of subro-
gation notice. In the present case the letter of Aug-
ust 4, 1967, is wholly deficient as notice in that it 
fails to state that payment has been made, and in 
fact affirmatively states that it has not been called 
upon to make payment, and in addition character-
izes plaintiff's interest as only "possible interest." 
The letter merely speaks of a possible subrogation, 
and thus if viewed in light of the above cited cases 
the notice is obviously deficient. Appellant urges 
this Court to apply the criteria above set forth to 
the present case and find the letter of August 4 was 
insufficient notice. 
With the letter of August 4 failing as notice, 
the question then arises as to whether defendant 
Farmers did, prior to August 9, have notice of the 
August 4 payments. No evidence was available at 
the summary judgment hearing upon which to de-
cide that issue. The defendants there suggested that 
such issue should be resolved before a summary 
judgment against the defendant would be proper; 
however, the court proceeded to rule on the notice 
without further evidence. As the evidence stands 
now, the notice was insufficient and thus it would 
be incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce evidence 
of knowledge by defendant prior to August 9 in 
order to raise a right of subrogation, if in fact one 
so exists. The notice issue being very material should 
have been thoroughly examined by the finder of 
fact before judgment against defendant could be 
justified. On this basis, defendant claims error. 
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SUMMARY 
Defendant respectfully submits that to allow 
the plaintiff to subrogate on medical expenses would 
merely open up a new Pandora's box with the re-
sulting multiplication of suits, the juggling around 
of all of the medical expense carriers trying to be-
come secondary rather than primary, the traffic-
king of such causes of action, and other previously 
mentioned undesirable social results. In addition 
such subrogation is in fact the splitting of a cause 
of action for personal injuries and constitutes an 
illegal asignment of the same. Although there may 
be some advantages to the insurance companies in 
allowing said subrogation, the disadvantages greatly 
outweigh the advantages. Defendant thus prays 
that the Court rule as a matter of law that there is 
no right of subrogation for medical expenses in the 
State of Utah and that the summary judgment 
granted to the plaintiff by the lower court be re· 
versed and the case dismissed. If this Court should, 
however, find there is a right of subrogation, de· 
fendant submits that the court erred in ruling as a 
matter of law on the issue of notice inasmuch as the 
letter of August 4 was insufficient to raise the right 
of subrogation and until the plaintiff could prove 
by further evidence that there was actual notice, the 
court erred m granting judgment against the de· 
fendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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